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Abstract
Cross-border transfer of electric power promotes collaboration in power generation between integrated electricity markets. It
resolves grid reinforcement issues in existing transmission networks. Because of that, researchers have given higher attention to this
ﬁeld and conducted various studies on the subject using technical simulation approaches. Yet, substantial work has to be done for
quantifying the socioeconomic beneﬁts of the mechanism. This paper intends to ﬁll the gap by introducing a method for analyzing
the mechanism by representing it as a game of incomplete information. The subject is modeled as a Bayesian game in which the
type of marginal generators located within one (or more) external market area is not known. Based on that, the Bayesian equilibrium
which represents the state where all marginal generators would incline to converge is found. The authors suggest that the method
is robust and can be used for quantifying the performance of a market coupling mechanism because it realistically considers all
marginal generation scenarios.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Previously, transmission lines that span across regions within Europe are primarily used for stabilizing the transmis-
sion network [1]. Because of the recommendation in EU Directive 96/92 for creating a harmonious Internal Electricity
Market (IEM), these transmission lines are increasingly used in the trade of electric power across borders. Consequently,
the transmission bottlenecks become a major concern. These issues are treated in the successive legislations: (i.) the EU
Regulation 1228/2003 which promotes development of market-based congestion management to appropriately reﬂect
price signals and incentive of investments; and (ii.) Commission Decision 2006/770/EC which suggests implementation
of ﬂow-based allocation governed by physical ﬂow of electric power. These directives further promote the sharing of
power generation and implementation of Flow Based Market Coupling (FBMC) mechanisms.
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Generally, cross-border transfer of electric power is a known mechanism which encourages the sharing of power
generation resources. It promotes liquidity and competition among stakeholders of connected electricity markets,
while reducing the tendency of price hoarding [2]. This further enhances the welfare and security of power supply
in interconnected market areas. Additionally, it is viewed as a viable means for resolving grid reinforcement issues.
Nonetheless, the implementation of FBMC is not without its challenges. Most noticeably, the tie lines connecting many
European countries possess limited transfer capacity. This complicates the quantiﬁcation of operational parameters
(i.e., transfer capacity of ﬂow-gates) within the mechanism.
Therefore, it is crucial for developing a viable analytical method for quantifying the extent of improvement that
FBMC could bring to an electricity market. The model should simultaneously consider the transmission network
limitations and the strategic trading behavior of stakeholders. By doing so, we have to deal with many unknown
variables in the electricity market model. Particularly, the exact setup that the market (and transmission network) would
eventually evolve has yet to be publicly announced. Furthermore, the details of marginal cost of generators located
within relevant market areas are not publicly accessible. Fortunately, game theory oﬀers several analytical methods that
could be applied for serving the purpose in the absence of clear price information [3].
In this paper, the authors outline a game theoretic approach for quantifying the expected performance of FBMC
scenarios. The mechanism is modeled as a game of incomplete information played by active generators located within
market areas which implement FBMC. This approach adopts the Bayesian game theory [4,5,6], which is known as
a robust means for deriving the expected utility of a game [7]. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the equilibriums in strategic interactions; Section III outlines strategic interactions and equilibriums
in FBMC; Section IV describes the methods and steps implemented in the analysis; Section V shows and discusses the
results obtained in the analysis; and Section VI concludes the paper.
2. Equilibriums in strategic interactions
The Bayesian game theory developed by John C. Harsanyi [4,5,6] is a ﬁeld of non-cooperative game theory which
was initially established by John F. Nash [8,9]. In 1949 [10], Nash (by generalizing the two-player zero-sum games
developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern [11]) proved that every multi-player, non-cooperative game possesses at
least one equilibrium state where all of the players would incline to converge. The states are known as Nash equilibrium
(NE) where the players receive no incentive for changing their incumbent strategy.
Essentially, game theorists study the strategic interactions among players participating in a strategic game and
how NE would be achieved. The strategic interactions are deﬁned as a situation in games where each player intends
to maximize his respective payoﬀ while his payoﬀ depends on the strategies taken by his opponents [7]. Such
interdependence of outcome is indicated with a Cartesian product in player i’s utility function, ui = Ai × · · · × AN → R,
where Ai = {a1, . . . , aN} represents the set of actions taken by player i.
Broadly, Ai consists of the following types: (i.) player i may execute an action, ak which he thinks is the best response
to his opponents (i.e., he may bid in the market using his true marginal cost); and (ii.) player i may consecutively
execute Ai following a probability distribution (i.e., he may bid in the market in a random manner, with probability x at
high price, and probability 1 − x at true marginal cost). The players achieve a pure-strategy NE if they reached the
equilibrium state while all of them consistently execute an action (following the former type). Otherwise, they achieve
a mixed-strategy NE if they reached the equilibrium state while some (or all) of them execute a ﬁnite list of actions in a
random manner (following the latter type).
Based on that, we can mathematically denote the strategy taken by player i with Si ≡ {s1, . . . , sN}, where sk is the
probability for executing ak (the subset of Ai) owned by player i. A mixed-strategy NE is therefore, an NE state achieved
when each of the players executes a list of his actions following sk : ak → [0, 1) and ∑ sk(ak) = 1. Pure-strategy NE is
the degenerated case of mixed-strategy NE, in which all players execute only one ak with probability sk(ak) = 1.
In its original form, NE possesses some limitations related to its strict rationality assumptions. Although the game is
assumed as imperfect (each player does not know exactly the action that his opponents are about to take), it assumes that
all of them know exactly the type of their opponents [12]. This assumption is not always true. For instance, in coupled
electricity market, a generator could neither know the type of marginal generators (thermal, hydro, etc) located in other
market areas that would participate in short-term bidding nor their exact location within the transmission network. Even
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though he may guess the marginal cost of generation owned by these generators based on past experience (empirical
information) [12], he cannot decide any action because of the incomplete knowledge on the type of his opponents.
Although NE does not apply well in such cases, we can use Bayesian game theory for solving the problem. This
method allows a player to form ﬁrst-order believe on the type of his opponent before determining his best response in a
game [13]. The best responses are determined based on expected utility functions. As an extension of NE, the method
allows us to consider all possible types of each player in game based on the probability of occurrence. For instance,
suppose a generator located within an area is proposing a bid price at hour t. Meanwhile, its operator believes that
another connected market area possesses two generators which have the following similarities: (i.) marginal cost, (ii.)
remaining generation capacity; and (iii.) ramping characteristics. Also, he knows that both of them share the same
possibility of being the marginal generator. Then, he can include this perception by modeling the marginal generator in
that area as a Bayesian player, with p = 0.5 for being either the ﬁrst or the second unit.
Formally, let θi be the type of player i in a game, and p(θ−i|θi) represents the ﬁrst-order belief owned by player i
towards the type of his opponent (given that his type is θi, which is known only to himself). The set of all types of
player i is Θi and θi ∈ [0, 1) for all θi ∈ Θi. Under such conditions, a player would choose his action based on his type,
and diﬀerent actions may be assigned to diﬀerent types. Based on that, he owns a strategy, si that maps Θi to Ai. Hence,
si : Θi → Ai. Since Bayesian game theory suggests that the choice of a player’s action follows θi and p(θ−i|θi), the
expected payoﬀ for player i in the game becomes:
E[ui(si|s−i, θi)] =
∑
θi∈Θ−i
ui(si, s−i(θi), θi, θ−i)p(θi|θ−i) (1)
where, s−i(θi) is the strategy taken by players except player i, given that the type of player i is θi. A Bayesian equilibrium
(BE) is the Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game, formulated as follows.
E[ui(si|s−i, θi)] ≥ E[ui(s′i |s−i, θi)] (2)
Upon achieving BE, player i receives a lower expected utility if he uses a strategy other than si (denoted by s′i ). The
existence of BE is guaranteed because of the proven existence of NE.
3. Strategic interactions and equilibriums in coupled electricity markets
Interactions between strategic players (marginal generators) participating in a wholesale electricity market could be
deﬁned as a non-cooperative strategic game. Ideally, we assume that the players do not resort to collusions and treat
each of their counterparts as an opponent. They too have small inﬂuence on the outcome of the bid [14]. They compete
in the two-sided auction process by means of selecting a marginal cost from a ﬁnite range of values and propose it to
the market organizer [15]. Their aim is to receive the highest possible payoﬀ after the market is cleared. They are said
to behave strategically if they propose a price other than their true marginal cost in the bidding process [16]. They have
market power if they receive increased proﬁt by implementing strategic bidding.
Many important assumptions adopted in non-cooperative game theory are applicable in analyzing such scenarios.
Most importantly, bidding activities in an electricity market are an iterated game. This suits the mass action principle
proposed by Nash [17,18,19]. Subsequently, the rationality assumptions in NE also apply well in this area [7]. The mass
action theorem states that players in an iterative game would continually adapt their strategy following the direction of
a better reply to whatever is being played by the entire population of players. The adjustment stops only when an NE
state is achieved. The theorem ﬁts well with the operation of an electricity market because (i.) the main structure of the
transmission network does not change in short time; and (ii.) the load demand within the market follows a consistent
cyclical trend over weeks, months, quarters and years. This forms an iterative environment where active generators
gain empirical information on the relative consequence of their strategies [19]. Later, they are able to make correct
judgments hence stabilizing themselves in NE.
The use of NE theory alone is limited in the analysis of coupled electricity markets because of its strict rationality
assumptions. Before the implementation of market coupling, active generators located within a market area only
possess empirical information leading to the formation of strategies within their local market. Nonetheless, they do not
have suﬃcient information for dealing with strategic bidding of active generators located in other market areas. After
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the implementation of market coupling, they have to observe various uncertainties in the operation of the market while
each of them only has experience dealing with active generators located in their local market. They would not know the
type of marginal generator they shall compete with, under various load levels. They become ex-interim players (who
know about their own type but not the type of the other players [20]) and fail to immediately form exact common priors.
Literally, BE theory can be applied for adressing this issue. Based on incomplete information, it is able to quantify
the potential inﬂuence of market coupling on the expected payoﬀs received by generators located in each area. This
helps in justifying the overall performance of a proposed market design involving market couplings. As mentioned in
Port Royal Logic [21], we should consider the probabilities of all scenarios, and put them in geometrical proportions
when considering a combined eﬀect of the scenarios. BE theory deals with incomplete information problems in that
manner.
In the following sections, the authors explore the implementation of FBMC. Generally, FBMC is an extension
of the zonal pricing scheme which is intended for use in organizing the bidding of cross-border transfer of electric
power within a common Day-Ahead (DA) market [22]. The dispatch within the entire network is cleared based on an
approximated transmission network that closely represents the physical ﬂow of electric power. Hence, three unknown
variables may aﬀect the expected utilities received by the generators within each market area: (i.) the transmission
network conﬁguration characteristics (especially, the Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs)) of an external
market; (ii.) the possibility that an external market may divide into smaller market areas in order to deal with internal
congestion issues or to allow better involvement of generators in cross-border DA bidding; and (iii.) the type of
marginal generators located in external market areas for all load instances.
The authors show a case study of FBMC in a transmission network. The implementation intends to cover the
mentioned unknowns and outline the method implemented for computing the expected payoﬀs received by all marginal
generators located in each market area at BE.
4. Implementation
The construction of the FBMC model begins with representation of each market area in the transmission network
as a node (copper-plate) [22]. The combined characteristics of transmission lines (also known as the interfaces
connecting them) are represented as ﬁctitious transmission lines which possess ﬂow characteristics computed as close
as possible to their physical value. The method neither modiﬁes the existing network conﬁgurations nor the market area
arrangements. The optimal dispatch can be computed with Direct Current Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF) computation.
It simultaneously clears the generation dispatch and physical ﬂow of power within the entire network.
The key to implementing a successful FBMC model is the correct representation of power ﬂow between market
areas (nodes in the approximated transmission network model) through the interfaces. Any deviation from the real
characteristics would create an ineﬃcient (suboptimal) generation dispatch plan [2]. Speciﬁcally, the Generation
Shift Factors (GSFs) at all interfaces have to be properly computed. Various methods have been used by researchers
to achieve this. For instance, Krause [22] represented each of the interfaces as a line of equivalent reactance, and
Kurzidem [23] used Interface-GSF (I-GSF) for representing the total power ﬂow on each of the interfaces, when
one unit of power is generated within a market area while another unit of power is consumed in a reference market
area. Domestic congestion within each market area is ignored because FBMC concerns only cross-border transfer of
power. Furthermore, it is built upon the existing arrangement of market areas, which has already resolved the internal
congestion issues.
The use of I-GSF is practical because Transmission System Operators (TSOs) of connected market areas are able
to estimate this variable without knowing the details of the transmission network located in an external market area.
Nevertheless, the method too has limitations. Due to the aggregation of buses in a market area as a single node, we
have diﬃculties in choosing the right reference bus for establishing the I-GSF matrices. The I-GSF computed using
diﬀerent reference bus varies, thus creating an asymmetric power ﬂow in the network. Also, DC-OPF would compute
power ﬂow with the assumption that in the market area where the reference bus is located, power is only consumed at
the reference bus. In most cases, this does not represent the real consumption of power within that area because power
retrieved from buses other than the reference bus (within the same area) is not taken into account.
In view of that, the authors redeﬁne I-GSF as the extent of changes in power ﬂow on all interfaces caused by the
generation of one unit of power in the marginal bus located within a market area, followed by the consumption of
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one unit of power in the reference market area. The method does not lose its generality because market areas in large
transmission networks (i.e., pan-European transmission network) may cover a substantially wide geographical region.
In that case, it is reasonable to assume that the load is distributed evenly to all buses within a market area. Furthermore,
the market areas are arranged such that the load at all enclosed buses does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the average
value (especially if rural areas and urban areas form diﬀerent market areas because of the transmission bottlenecks).
Let’s apply the method on a case study using the transmission network model shown in Fig. 1. The model is
constructed by slightly modifying the standard IEEE 30-bus test system. Each generator in the model comprises
two units, with a generation capacity, and marginal cost of generation, Cg shown in Table 1. The transfer limit of
transmission lines other than L12, L14, L15, L26 and L36 is inﬁnite. The transfer limit of these lines (L12, L14, L15,
L26 and L36) is considered as a binding constraint in the power ﬂow computation (the same technique is applied in
[24], where the transfer limit of some transmission lines in the model is regarded as binding constraint). The power
generated is dispatched in two consecutive stages. First, 60% of the total load demand (170.04 MW) is cleared with
DC-OPF computation. This forms the base case of dispatch, which represents the arrangement to supply the base load
and intermediate load pre-deﬁned in long-term markets. It is assumed that the generators do not interact strategically at
this stage.
Afterwards, the remaining transfer capacity in each of the interfaces is used in FBMC. Three parameters are required
in this stage of computation:
i. The marginal generator located in each area
The marginal generator located in each area is determined after the implementation of DC-OPF at 60% total load
level. A generator is selected from each area, to supply the next unit of power.
ii. The computation of I-GSF
The I-GSF computation begins with the selection of the reference area. Basically, it either comprises one or
multiple areas selected within the model. They are chosen based on the following criteria: (i.) areas possessing
insuﬃcient generation capacity, where the remaining generation capacity of the marginal generator is inadequate
for supplying the local load demand; and (ii.) the area with the marginal generator that possesses the highest Cg,
if all areas do not meet the former criterion. Next, I-GSF is computed by summing the total GSF created, when
one unit of power is generated within each area (by their respective marginal generators) followed by withdrawal
of one unit of power evenly distributed to all buses within the reference area. If the reference area consists of
more than one area, the load is ﬁrst proportionately distributed to these areas before the average value of load is
computed for all enclosed buses.
iii. The transfer capacity at the interfaces
The transfer capacity at the interfaces is computed by means of determining the maximum value of distributed load
demand in the reference area (as in the case of I-GSF) that could be supported by the transmission network. The
load demand at the reference area is incrementally increased, and DC-OPF is implemented after each increment
until an infeasible solution is found (this indicates that a transmission constraint is violated). At that point, the
total power ﬂow within each interface is used as the available transfer capacity.
The marginal generators that serve the load demand in the DA market (after 60% of the total load demand is served
in the base case) are shown in Table 2. The remaining load demand in areas 1, 2, and 3 is 71.48 MW, 19.4 MW, and
22.48 MW respectively. In addition, four generators are identiﬁed as marginal generators in the DA market, which are
G11 (in area 1), G41 and G61 (in area 2) and G31 (in area 3). Two marginal generators are identiﬁed for area 2 because
they possess similar Cg. Area 1 is selected as the reference area (in the establishment of I-GSF) because it possesses
the marginal generator with the highest Cg.
The marginal generators located in area 2 could exist in three diﬀerent forms, causing area 2 to exhibit diﬀerent
types of unknown to marginal generators in other areas. Most importantly, the actual type in area 2 is unknown to the
marginal generator in area 3 which strategically interacts with it for serving the load demand in the net importing area
(area 1). The types are listed as below:
i. Only G41 is used as the marginal generator in area 2 for serving the load demand in the DA market (type a).
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Fig. 1. A slightly modiﬁed IEEE 30-bus test system.
Table 1. Generators in the transmission network model (Fig. 1).
Name Generator Capacity [MW] Cost [$/h]
G1 1 35 55
2 20 50
G2 1 30 55
2 25 50
G3 1 35 25
2 20 30
G4 1 40 30
2 30 10
G5 1 35 25
2 30 10
G6 1 35 30
2 35 10
Table 2. Load served, DA load demand, and marginal generator for use in the DA market.
Area Load served DA load demand Marginal unit
A1 107.22 71.48 G11
A2 29.1 19.4 G41 and G61
A3 33.72 22.48 G31
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ii. Either G41 or G61 is used as the marginal generator in area 2 (type b). Each of them may create diﬀerent patterns
of power ﬂow on the interfaces. This is because of their relative location within the transmission network, which
creates diﬀerent I-GSFs.
iii. Both G41 and G61 are used as marginal generators in area 2 (type c). This is possible if area 2 divides itself
into two smaller local areas either for resolving internal congestion issues or for allowing both generators to
simultaneously participate in the DA market. The I-GSF for this case is again, diﬀerent compared with types a and
b.
Based on that, we can deﬁne the strategic interactions between marginal generators in areas 2 and 3 as a Bayesian
game (see Fig. 2). Conventionally, a virtual player called “nature” is included in this game, which assigns the probability
of area 2 in exhibiting each of the mentioned types. The assignment depends on the ﬁrst-order belief (on the type of
marginal generator in area 2) owned by the marginal generator located within area 3. Let’s assume that the probability
of area 2 to appear respectively as types a, b and c is 0.4, 0.3, and 0.3. Hence, we assume that the likelihood for area 2
in using G41 as the marginal generator is higher.
Four non-singleton information sets exist in the game, each related to the ﬁrst-order belief of the marginal generators
on the types of their opponents. The ﬁrst information set which includes node 2 to 5 of the game tree shown in Fig. 2
relates to the generators located within area 2 . The remainder of the information sets relates to the response of G31
located within area 3, based on the perceived types of marginal generators in area 2.
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Fig. 2. The Bayesian game in cross-border trade of electric power simulated in this work.
Three matrix games (subgames in normal form) are established based on the perception of G31 on the types of
marginal generators in area 2. First, the matrix game I is played when G41 is used in area 2 as the marginal generator.
This happens when area 2 is perceived as either type a or b. Second, the matrix game II is played when G61 is used as
the marginal generator in area 2 (type b). Third, the matrix game III is played when both G41 and G61 are used as
marginal generators in area 2 (type c). In these games, the marginal generators interact with each other by adjusting
their proposed Cg, so as to gain the highest payoﬀ through the bidding process. Three levels of Cg can be proposed by
each of them, which are low (l, equal to true Cg), medium (m, equal to true Cg + 5) or high (h, equal to true Cg + 10)
values. For instance, the list of candidate Cg for G31 is {25, 30, 35}. The payoﬀs received by the marginal generators in
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the matrix games are obtained through DC-OPF computation implemented on the approximated transmission network
model. The payoﬀ values are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
Table 3. Payoﬀs received by G41 and G31 if marginal generator in area 2 consists of type a or b.
G41 – G31 Low bid Medium bid High bid
Low bid 700, 1000 700, 800 700, 600
Medium bid 525, 1000 525, 800 525, 600
High bid 350, 1000 350, 800 350, 600
Table 4. Payoﬀs received by G61 and G31 if marginal generator in area 2 consists of type b.
G61 – G31 Low bid Medium bid High bid
Low bid 700, 875 700, 700 700, 525
Medium bid 525, 875 525, 700 525, 525
High bid 350, 875 350, 700 350, 525
Table 5. Payoﬀs received by i.) G41 and G61, and ii.) G31 if marginal generator in area 2 consists of type c.
G41, G61 – G31 Low bid Medium bid High bid
Low bid 1400, 465.83 1400, 372.66 1400, 592.12
Medium bid 1050, 465.83 1050, 372.66 1050, 600
High bid 700, 465.83 700, 372.66 700, 279.5
5. Results and discussion
The Bayesian game is solved with Gambit solver [25]. In the process, it is found that a pure-strategy NE exists in
each of the matrix games. These NEs happen when (i.) G41 and G31 simultaneously propose a low bid in matrix game
I (Table 3); (ii.) G61 and G31 simultaneously propose a low bid in matrix game II (Table 4); and (iii.) G41 and G61
propose a low bid while G31 proposes a high bid in matrix game III (Table 5). A BE is as well identiﬁed in the game,
which happens when G31 proposes a low bid in matrix games I and II (if marginal generator in area 2 is of types a and
b), and a high bid in matrix game III (if marginal generator in area 2 is of type c). Meanwhile,the marginal generators
in area 2 (G41 and G61) propose a low bidding price in all of the matrix games. When BE is reached, the marginal
generators in area 2 (G41 and G61) collectively earn 910 as payoﬀ. Simultaneously, the marginal generator in area 3
(G31) earns 858 as payoﬀ.
Consequently, it is known that the players in the game would propose bidding prices to the DA market following the
strategy suggested by BE. This is because, BE is the state where all of them would incline to converge after interacting
iteratively with each other within the same market framework. This certainty is assured as long as they make rational
decisions at all time. For instance, G31 receives less incentive if he deviates from the BE strategy and proposes a
medium bidding price in matrix game I (Table 3). In that case, he would receive 800 instead of 1000 as payoﬀ. In view
of that, we can apply Bayesian game analysis for determining the expected payoﬀs received by all market areas when
an equilibrium state is achieved within a proposed market design. In other words, BE can be used as a criterion for
quantifying the impact and performance of a market design option. As in the case study, it is clearly shown that the
expected payoﬀs received by the generators within areas 2 and 3 do not diﬀer substantially. This indicates that the
market mechanism works well.
Also, BE is guaranteed to exist in all strategic games of incomplete information. This is well supported by practical
reasons. BE is the state where all of the marginal generators receive the best award as they depend on their opponents
for determining the power dispatch.
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6. Conclusions
This paper presents the Bayesian game theory and its application in analyzing cross-border transfer of electric
power. It explains how the method could be used in dealing with cross-border transfer within a market mechanism
that contains market players possessing uncertain types of marginal generators. The method described in this paper is
demonstrated with a case study that comprises a simple three-area transmission network implementing FBMC. It is
shown that BE could be a good indicator for representing the impact and performance of a market design framework.
Based on that, the authors suggest (at least in the planning stage) that the Bayesian game theory can be applied for
creating baseline performance indicators that take all possible types (that may exist within external market areas) into
account. These indicators can as well be used as a means for comparing market design proposals, which lead to the
selection of the best possible option for implementation.
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